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Regulating Data Breaches: A Data 
Superfund Statute 
ABSTRACT 
Collecting and processing large amounts of personal data has 
become a fundamental feature of the modern economy. Personal data, 
combined with good data analytics, are valuable to businesses as they 
can provide highly detailed information about individual preferences 
and behaviors. This data collection can also be valuable to the consumer 
as it generates innovative products and digital platforms. The era of  
big data promises great rewards, but it is not without its costs.  
Data breaches, or the release of personal data into unwanted hands,  
are pervasive and increasingly massive in scale. Despite the personal 
privacy harm caused by data breaches, businesses can largely 
externalize the costs of these breaches to the public. While privacy  
harm is undoubtedly an important issue, the release of data  
generates arguably more significant social costs. This Note argues that 
policy makers should view the unwanted release of data as a form of 
pollution that dilutes critical public goods. As such, an effective 
regulatory solution to data breaches should mirror the current 
regulatory approaches to environmental pollution. Like the physical 
environment, the data environment is a complex and highly 
interconnected system; accordingly, there is unlikely to be a single best 
way to regulate it. Thus far, the United States has approached data 
regulation in a stepwise and targeted fashion, much like environmental 
regulation. This approach has some advantages, but there is a pressing 
need for more comprehensive regulation. Current proposals point to 
omnibus privacy laws like the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation and the California Consumer Privacy Act as a 
solution. However, these regulations are ultimately privacy focused and 
impose high costs on the data economy. To balance these concerns, this 
Note proposes that Congress enact federal legislation implementing a 
data protection statute modeled after the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.   
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In 2019, approximately 540 million Facebook user records were 
released to the public on Amazon’s cloud computing service by two 
third-party Facebook app developers.1 This included a wealth of 
personal data, such as account names, IDs, location check-ins, 
unprotected passwords, and general user activity.2 This data breach3 is 
 
 1. Jason Silverstein, Hundreds of Millions of Facebook User Records Were Exposed on 
Amazon Cloud Server, CBS NEWS (Apr. 4, 2019, 11:35 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mil-
lions-facebook-user-records-exposed-amazon-cloud-server/ [https://perma.cc/B5D7-Y4KE].  
 2. See id. 
 3. See Kevin Ferguson, Data Breach, SEARCHSECURITY: TECHTARGET, http://searchsecu-
rity.techtarget.com/definition/data-breach [https://perma.cc/M3YC-BJXU] (last updated May 
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one of the largest of all time.4 However, this was not the first time in 
recent years that Facebook—a company with personal data pertaining 
to over 2.3 billion active monthly users worldwide—had suffered a 
major data breach.5 Even more concerning, Facebook is not alone. In 
2019, major breaches also affected well-known entities such as 
Microsoft, Instagram, Adobe, DoorDash, and Fortnite.6   
In an information-age economy increasingly driven by the 
collection of data,7 these data breaches are not going away. Americans 
transmit their data through personal computers, mobile phones, and 
internet devices to private companies at an exponential rate.8 By 2025, 
the proliferation of these devices means that each person with an 
internet-connected device will have at least one data interaction every 
eighteen seconds, or almost five thousand per day.9 As institutions 
collect this increasingly large pool of consumer data, the risk of 
exposure will continue to grow.10  
In light of these trends, this Note argues that current 
government intervention is insufficient to protect the public from data 
breaches affecting private firms. Part I begins with a discussion of 
current data collection practices and explains why personal and 
economic incentives fail to effectively police firm behavior. It further 
provides an overview of relevant privacy laws and the various 
regulatory regimes that serve to protect consumer data in the United 
States. Part II addresses the limitations and shortcomings of that 
regulatory regime, particularly with regard to newer legislation such as 
the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and the European Union’s 
 
2019) (defining data breach). When “sensitive, confidential or otherwise protected data” such as 
this are either accessed or disclosed by an unauthorized party, it is referred to as a data breach. 
Id. 
 4. Kenneth Kiesnoski, 5 of the Biggest Data Breaches Ever, CNBC (July 30, 2019,  
10:22 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/30/five-of-the-biggest-data-breaches-ever.html 
[https://perma.cc/CV4Y-ACSW]. 
 5. Silverstein, supra note 1. In 2018, the information of 50 million users was exposed in 
an attack on Facebook’s networks, and in 2016 it was revealed that Cambridge Analytica, a  
company working on the Trump campaign, gained access to information from more than 87 million 
users. Id. 
 6. Rob Sobers, 107 Must-Know Data Breach Statistics for 2020, VARONIS, https://www.va-
ronis.com/blog/data-breach-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/2QJZ-Z38Y] (last updated Sept. 24, 2020). 
 7. See Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/05/06/data-is-giving-rise-to-a-new-economy 
[https://perma.cc/WLX7-XKZ2].  
 8. See STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN & CHRIS D. LINEBAUGH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45631, DATA 
PROTECTION LAW: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2019). 
 9. Joseph V. DeMarco & Brian A. Fox, Data Rights and Data Wrongs: Civil Litigation 
and the New Privacy Norms, 128 YALE L.J.F. 1016, 1020 (2019). 
 10. See MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 1–2. 
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General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Part III explores the 
similarity between data breaches and environmental pollution. It 
argues that the environmental laws that regulate the release of 
hazardous substances can serve as an effective model for regulating 
data pollution. Specifically, this Note recommends that Congress 
implement a federal statute modeled after the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
also known as the Superfund Statute. Such a liability-focused regime, 
along with certain prescriptive requirements, would incentivize better 
data protection at a minimal cost.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Current Data Practices 
1. Data Collection 
Companies derive significant economic benefits from 
aggregating personal data and selling it to third parties.11 Data brokers, 
an important subsection of firms that collect and sell data, demonstrate 
how profitable this practice can be. These firms collect a wide range of 
data, such as “bankruptcy information, voting registration, consumer 
purchase data, web browsing activities, warranty registrations, and 
other details of consumers’ everyday interactions.”12 Once collected and 
aggregated, brokers sell this data to businesses for a variety of 
purposes, such as sending targeted advertisements or verifying 
identities to mitigate risk.13 The nine firms mentioned in the report 
alone collect data on billions of individuals, including one firm that had 
over three thousand data segments for nearly every US consumer.14 
Indeed, in an industry that includes between 2,500 and 4,000 data 
brokers, these nine brokers generated $426 million in annual revenue.15  
A data broker’s objective in gathering all of this data is to create 
an easily accessible compendium of consumer information that provides 
 
 11. See Patrick Myers, Protecting Personal Information: Achieving a Balance Between 
User Privacy and Behavioral Targeting, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 717, 723 (2016). 
 12. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY iv (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-
transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerre-
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W56-YA5N]. 
 13. Id. at ii–iii.  
 14. Id. at 8–9.  
 15. Id. at 23; Paul Boutin, The Secretive World of Selling Data About You, NEWSWEEK 
(May 30, 2016, 2:30 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/secretive-world-selling-data-about-you-
464789 [https://perma.cc/H9K3-YRUW]. 
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powerful insight into consumer preferences.16 Data are collected from a 
variety of sources including government databases, social media, and 
commercial sources.17 Each source may provide only a few data 
elements about a consumer, but, once combined, even information that 
is seemingly anonymous can be used to create a shockingly 
comprehensive profile of an individual.18 With this information, a firm 
could match an individual’s browser history with her profile to 
“identify” the consumer and target her with advertisements for 
products that she might be more likely to purchase.19 Taken a step 
further, these individual behaviors can then be grouped together and 
used to identify generalizable patterns of behavior.20 The result is a 
powerful tool with vast potential in the commercial realm21 and 
beyond.22 
2. The Consumer Privacy Paradox 
Although society stands to benefit from data collection, 
consumers do not know the scope or quantity of personal data that firms 
collect23 and are concerned about how firms use their data.24 For 
instance, data collection practices in the data broker industry make it 
nearly impossible for consumers to control the spread of personal data.25 
Unlike large, identifiable companies like Facebook, these brokers are 
shrouded in obscurity and avoid name recognition.26 Data are often not 
collected directly from consumers and can be resold freely among 
 
 16. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 12, at 31.  
 17. Id. at 11, 13. 
 18. Id. at 46. 
 19. Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, 
or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 445–47 (2011). 
 20. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution, 11 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 104, 112, 114 (2019). 
 21. See generally FORBES INSIGHTS, THE BIG POTENTIAL OF BIG DATA: A FIELD GUIDE  
FOR CMOS (2013), https://images.forbes.com/forbesinsights/StudyPDFs/RocketFuel_Big-
Data_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/WKE6-UVU8]. 
 22. See, e.g., Sabyasachi Dash, Sushil Kumar Shakyawar, Mohit Sharma & Sandeep 
Kaushik, Big Data in Healthcare: Management, Analysis and Future Prospects, 6 J. BIG DATA,  
no. 1, 2019, at 1; Nir Kshetri, The Emerging Role of Big Data in Key Development Issues:  
Opportunities, Challenges, and Concerns, BIG DATA & SOCIETY, July–Dec. 2014, at 1 (2014). 
 23. See FED TRADE COMM’N, supra note 12, at 46. 
 24. Brooke Auxier, Lee Rainie, Monica Anderson, Andrew Perrin, Madhu Kumar & Erica 
Turner, Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of Control over Their  
Personal Information, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/inter-
net/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-
personal-information/ [https://perma.cc/2NLD-LH2E]. 
 25. See FED TRADE COMM’N, supra note 12. 
 26. See Theodore Rostow, What Happens When an Acquaintance Buys Your Data: A New 
Privacy Harm in the Age of Data Brokers, 34 YALE J. ON REGUL. 667, 674 (2017). 
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brokers.27 Moreover, even if a consumer shared limited personal 
information with an identifiable and trusted firm, she may have 
unknowingly granted its unrestricted use by any data broker willing to 
pay the price.28  
Of course, most firms ask consumers to consent to a privacy 
agreement; thus, consumers arguably should know their data can be 
sold to third parties.29 The voluntary transfer of data in exchange for a 
specific web or app product could be seen as a legitimate transaction 
between the user and the firm. For example, courts regularly uphold 
the validity of  “click-wrap agreements,” where users agree to the terms 
of complex privacy agreements with the simple click of a button.30 
However, studies indicate that users typically do not read these policies, 
and, even if they do, many agreements do not make it clear that user 
data can be sold to third parties.31  
Overall, consumers seem to express a preference for privacy 
while continuing to blindly agree to policies and share personal data.32 
This phenomenon is sometimes labeled as the privacy paradox.33 
Consumers engage in a form of hyperbolic discounting, where they give 
up potentially valuable data in exchange for short-term and somewhat 
meager rewards.34 Consumers also seem to continue to provide data to 
companies even after major breaches.35 Indeed, even though consumers 
are concerned about their personal data generally, they have mixed 
attitudes concerning specific uses.36   
 
 27. See FED TRADE COMM’N, supra note 12. 
 28. See Myers, supra note 11, at 724.  
 29. See id.  
 30. Id. at 732–33. 
 31. See id. at 724; Auxier et al., supra note 24 (finding that only 22 percent of adults claim 
to always or sometimes read privacy polices). One study showed that 74 percent of participants 
consented to a fake social media website’s privacy policy without even reading the terms. Jonathan 
A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring the Privacy Policies and 
Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services, 23 INFO., COMMC’N & SOC’Y 128 (2020).  
 32. See Christine S. Wilson, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Future 
of Privacy Forum: A Defining Moment for Privacy: The Time Is Ripe for Federal Privacy  
Legislation (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/ 
1566337/commissioner_wilson_privacy_forum_speech_02-06-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB2Y-
FFYE]. 
 33. See, e.g., id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See John Naughton, The Privacy Paradox: Why Do People Keep Using Tech Firms That 
Abuse Their Data?, GUARDIAN (May 5, 2019, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentis-
free/2019/may/05/privacy-paradox-why-do-people-keep-using-tech-firms-data-facebook-scandal 
[https://perma.cc/87GQ-3PEL].  
 36. See Auxier et al., supra note 24. In a Pew Research survey, 48 percent of respondents 
believed it was acceptable for DNA testing companies to share customer genetic data to help solve 
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3. Externalizing Costs 
There are many reasons why data breaches occur. Although 
sometimes the source is an outside attacker, many data breaches occur 
because of inadvertent disclosures by company insiders.37 Regardless of 
the source, individuals tend to hold the business itself accountable.38 
Indeed, some notable data breaches have resulted in a stream of 
negative publicity and public outcry,39 and firms can face tort liability, 
often in the form of class action lawsuits.40 While this certainly  
imposes some costs on firms, they can frequently escape significant 
consequences.41 For example, a data breach can lead to a decrease in 
stock price or negative public perception, but these negative effects are 
generally short-lived.42 In addition, tort law remedies are notoriously 
difficult to obtain and have failed to keep pace with changing data 
practices.43 Even when obtained, damages are often minimal compared 
to the revenue of companies dealing in data.44 Moreover, the harm of a 
breach is not something that can really be undone.45 Once released, data 
can be copied and shared quickly with little cost. Damages may pay for 
identity theft monitoring, but ultimately the disclosure costs will 
continue to be carried by consumers. The result is a market failure 
 
crimes, while only 25 percent believed it was acceptable for makers of smart speakers to share 
personal audio data for the same purposes. Id.  
 37. See Long Cheng, Fang Liu & Danfeng Yao, Enterprise Data Breach: Causes,  
Challenges, Prevention, and Future Directions, WIRES DATA MINING & KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY, 
Sept.–Oct. 2017, at 1, 3–5. 
 38. Tara Seals, Consumers Overwhelmingly Blame Businesses for Breaches, 
INFOSECURITY MAG. (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/consumers-
overwhelmingly-blame/ [https://perma.cc/LAJ5-YB25]. 
 39. See, e.g., Tony Romm, Senators Slam Equifax, Marriott Executives for Massive Data 
Breaches, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2019, 12:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/ 
2019/03/07/senators-slam-equifax-marriott-executives-massive-data-breaches/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3UV7-L79V]. 
 40. See generally Alicia Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a 
Common Law Approach for Data Breaches, 127 YALE L.J.F. 614, 634 (2018). 
 41. See, e.g., Josephine Wolff, Opinion, Why It’s So Hard to Punish Companies for Data 
Breaches, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/16/opinion/facebook-data-
breach-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/C84L-VC9S]; Naughton, supra note 35. 
 42. See Wolff, supra note 41. In fact, firms may not know how to utilize or value consumer 
data. See Jeanne W. Ross, Cynthia M. Beath & Anne Quaadgras, You May Not Need Big Data 
After All, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2013, https://hbr.org/2013/12/you-may-not-need-big-data-after-all 
[https://perma.cc/XLG5-Y68G].  
 43. See Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1918 (2010).  
 44. See Wolff, supra note 41.  
 45. See Solow-Niederman, supra note 40, at 624.  
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where firms externalize a significant portion of the cost of data 
collection onto consumers.46 
B. Current Privacy Regulation 
The United States regulates commercial data protection through 
a combination of federal statutes, state statutes, tort actions, and 
private contracts.47 These regulations generally fall under the umbrella 
of privacy law.48 Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
the Constitution provides certain protections regarding individual 
privacy.49 However, the type of privacy contemplated by these 
constitutional protections is conceptually distinct from the protection of 
personal data at issue here.50  
1. Comparing Federal Statutes 
Unlike other jurisdictions, such as the European Union, there is 
no omnibus federal privacy legislation that governs commercial data 
practices in the United States.51 Instead, there is a patchwork of 
targeted data protection statutes at the federal level, with the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) left to fill in the gaps.52 Federal statutes 
either regulate specific industry participants, such as financial 
institutions, health care entities, and communications common 
carriers, or specific categories of data, like data pertaining to minors.53  
The scope and protections of these statutes are by no means 
uniform.54 Some succeed in preventing certain abuses while failing to 
protect against others. For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA) applies to a variety of entities that handle data relating to 
consumer creditworthiness.55 Regulations require that collected data 
are accurate and only used for limited purposes.56 The FTC and 
 
 46. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 20, at 107.  
 47. See L. BUS. RSCH., THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND CYBERSECURITY LAW REVIEW 
271–72 (Alan Charles Raul ed., 2014).  
 48. See id. at 272. 
 49. See MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 5.  
 50. See id. at 5–7.  
 51. See id. at 7–8. 
 52. See id.  
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. at 2. 
 55. Id. at 12 (including “(1) credit reporting agencies (CRAs), (2) entities furnishing  
information to CRAs (furnishers), and (3) individuals who use credit reports issued by CRAs  
(users)”). 
 56. Id.  
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) jointly enforce the 
provisions of the FCRA.57 There is also a private cause of action for 
consumers that are injured by willful or negligent violations of the Act.58  
On the one hand, the statutory scheme limits data sharing by placing 
restrictions on data that are important to consumers but largely out of 
their control.59 On the other hand, the scheme still allows for free 
disclosure of information to third parties without consumer consent and 
does not require entities to actually protect data from breaches.60  
The law regulating health care entities, the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), is a good example of a more 
comprehensive statute. HIPAA and the accompanying HIPAA Privacy 
Rule provide robust safeguards for protected health information 
(PHI).61 Covered entities and their business associates cannot use or 
share PHI without disclosing their purpose to consumers and obtaining 
consent.62 With respect to data security, covered entities must put in 
place certain safeguards and are required to notify individuals in the 
event of a breach.63 However, since the statute regulates specific 
covered entities, it only protects “channels of data flow,” rather than 
actual categories of data.64 In other words, data that are categorically 
similar but generated through inferences from data collected by 
nonregulated entities are not protected.65 For example, HIPAA does not 
apply to health data collected through Fitbit or Apple Watches.66 The 
end result is vast reservoirs of data that can be bought and sold relating 
to the health and physiology of individuals with no specific federal 
protection.67  
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) does 
more to address the “channels of data” critique68 by protecting data 
categorically.69 COPPA prohibits websites from collecting essentially 
any identifiable data about children under thirteen without verifiable 
parental consent.70 The requirements of COPPA are delineated and 
 
 57. Id. at 14. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. at 44. 
 60. Id. at 12. 
 61. Id. at 10–11. 
 62. Id. at 11. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Rostow, supra note 26, at 677. 
 65. See id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 678. 
 68. See id. 
 69. MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 24. 
 70. Id. 
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enforced by the FTC through the COPPA Rule.71 Notably, firms that 
collect data on minors must take reasonable procedures to protect their 
confidentiality, comply with deletion and retention requirements, and 
limit sharing to third parties.72 However, COPPA only applies to 
operators of websites or online activities “directed at children” (as 
defined by the FTC), or operators with actual knowledge they are 
collecting children’s data.73 In practice, firms can evade the COPPA 
Rule’s requirements with a formal policy banning children under 
thirteen and either a self-identification request or not asking for a user’s 
age at all.74 Moreover, a violation of the COPPA Rule is treated the 
same as a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act (discussed Section I.B.2 
below).75 So while the FTC may impose civil penalties, there are no 
criminal penalties or private causes of action available under the Act.76 
2. The Federal Trade Commission 
Personal data that are not protected by a specific statute are 
primarily regulated by the FTC through the FTC Act.77 Section 5 of the 
FTC Act declares “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce” unlawful.78 Private actors that are not regulated by a 
specific federal statute include merchants such as Macy’s or Amazon 
and prominent technology firms like Facebook and Google.79 The FTC 
has brought hundreds of enforcement actions against firms under 
Section 5, but most of these actions result in settlements.80 As such, 
there is very little case law on the subject.81 Instead, a collection of 
consent decrees, although not technically binding precedent, effectively 
creates a common law of privacy.82   
 
 71. Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 
2020), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-
asked-questions#General%20Questions [https://perma.cc/TF8K-HVF9].  
 72. MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 24. 
 73. 16 C.F.R. § 312.3 (2020). 
 74. See Shannon Finnegan, How Facebook Beat the Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Act: A Look into the Continued Ineffectiveness of COPPA and How to Hold Social Media Sites  
Accountable in the Future, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 827, 839–41 (2020). 
 75. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(c); MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 25. 
 76. MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 25. 
 77. Id. at 30. 
 78. 15 U.S.C. § 45.  
 79. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014).  
 80. MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 32. 
 81. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 79, at 588. 
 82. Id. at 624. 
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The most settled principle in the FTC privacy common law is 
that companies are bound by their privacy and data security promises 
under the “deceptive” prong of Section 5.83 Examples of deceptive 
behavior include violating the terms of a posted privacy policy, 
mispresenting intended data use, and not providing notice of data 
practices.84 The “unfairness” prong, on the other hand, is employed less 
frequently but can still be used beyond the scope of the “deceptive” 
prong.85 For example, in FTC v. Frostwire, the FTC alleged that a  
peer-to-peer file sharing application had unfair privacy settings because 
it shared information immediately upon installation.86 In addition, with 
respect to data security in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., the US 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit maintained that a company’s 
failure to safeguard personal data may be unfair, even if the company 
did not contradict its privacy policy.87 
3. State Law 
In addition to federal law, all fifty states have laws regulating 
privacy and implementing liability for data breaches.88 At the most 
basic level, this includes tort and contract law.89 Negligence claims and 
class actions can regulate businesses that are inured from data security 
issues or fail to protect their customers from foreseeable harm.90 
Contracts and implied contracts can protect against data breaches as 
part of commercial arrangements.91 Furthermore, many states have 
their own regulators policing unfair or deceptive practices modeled 
after the FTC.92 Unlike federal law, each state also has its own data 
breach law requiring a notification response or imposing liability on 
companies in the event of a data breach.93 
Notably, in 2018, California passed a particularly ambitious 
state privacy law, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).94 The 
 
 83. MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 32. 
 84. Id. at 32–33. 
 85. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 79, at 628, 638. 
 86. Complaint at 1, 13, FTC v. Frostwire LLC, No. 1:11-cv-23643 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2011). 
 87. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 245–46 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 88. MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 36–37. 
 89. Id. at 36. 
 90. Id. 
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CCPA categorically protects all “personal information” of Californians, 
which is defined broadly to include nearly any information a business 
might collect.95 Its provisions apply to any business that collects 
information from Californians, does business in California, and 
satisfies one of three threshold requirements.96 The CCPA specifies 
certain consumer rights, including the right to know why and what data 
firms are collecting, the right to opt out of the sale of personal data, and 
the right to demand that a company delete personal information.97 
Regarding data protection, the Act provides a private cause of action  
for consumers whose “nonencrypted and nonredacted personal 
information” is subject to an unauthorized disclosure as a result of a 
business’s failure to “implement reasonable security procedures and 
practices.”98 The proceeds from penalties and settlements under the Act 
are deposited in a Consumer Privacy Fund, which is used to offset the 
administration costs.99 When the CCPA was initially passed, the state 
attorney general was responsible for enforcement.100 However, in 
November 2020, California passed Proposition 24, which provides for 
the creation of a new state consumer privacy agency.101  
II. ANALYSIS 
A. The True Cost of a Data Breach  
1. Public Harms 
Current law regulating the use of personal data is focused on 
individual consumer privacy.102 Individual privacy is undoubtedly at 
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stake when firms store comprehensive profiles of information about 
consumers, but the release of data has far more serious implications on 
the public as whole. 
The greatest danger from data breaches comes from the 
predictive power of large aggregations of data sets. Although the 
unauthorized disclosure of personal information tends to capture the 
public’s attention, data can be deployed to provide insights into almost 
any human behavior.103 For instance, in 2012, Facebook ran a 
particularly troubling experiment where data scientists skewed seven 
hundred thousand users’ newsfeeds so that they showed either mostly 
positive content or mostly negative content.104 The affected users tended 
to post content that corresponded to the type of content on their 
newsfeed, which indicated that emotional states could be manipulated 
through the network.105 Alternatively, data brokers compile and sell 
collections of consumer profiles that identify vulnerable individuals, 
labeling them “Rural and Barely Making It,” “Ethnic Second-City 
Strugglers,” or “Retiring Empty: Singles.”106 There is already a 
potential for abuse when firms legally hold data like this, such as 
offering shoppers different discounts or services based on their 
geolocation.107 However, it is not hard to imagine how this could be used 
to facilitate illegal activity, as was the case in 2004 when criminals 
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bought data lists from a data broker in order to target seniors with 
telemarketing scams.108 The data broker advertised the lists with labels 
like “Suffering Seniors,” which corresponded to individuals with cancer 
and Alzheimer’s. One list even mocked the credulity of its own 
constituents, saying, “[t]hese people are gullible. . . . They want to 
believe that their luck can change.”109  
Under these circumstances, almost any transfer or release of 
data can lead to public harms. Although Facebook only ran its 
experiment for a week, several years later Cambridge Analytica 
obtained personal data from millions of Facebook accounts and 
facilitated the Russian disinformation campaign leading up to the 2016 
US Presidential Election.110 There is a clear privacy harm when 
Facebook transfers its users’ personal data without permission. 
However, this pales in comparison to the institutional harm that could 
come from foreign interference in US elections.111 
2. Comparing Data Breaches to Pollution 
Once understood as a public harm, it follows that data breaches 
should be regulated like other public harms. Here, a particularly 
compelling model is environmental regulation.112 The release of data is 
an unintended by-product of data collection and data-driven 
technologies, similar to how pollution—whether it be carbon emissions 
or the release of hazardous waste—is an unintended by-product of 
manufacturing industrial goods.113 Firms are able to externalize the 
costs of their activities onto the general public because the release of 
these by-products dilutes public goods.114 In the case of pollution, absent 
regulation, firms will contaminate public goods like clean air or water 
by improperly disposing of waste.115 While the release of data may not 
 
 108. Charles Duhigg, Bilking the Elderly, with a Corporate Assist, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/business/20tele.html [https://perma.cc/JS6J-P526].  
 109.   Id. 
 110. See Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the 
Fallout so Far, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cam-
bridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html [https://perma.cc/MVQ4-3Q2N].  
 111. See Ward, supra note 103.  
 112. See generally Ben-Shahar, supra note 20, at 112–14; Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs 
of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 241 (2007). 
 113. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 20, at 112.  
 114. See id. 
 115. See STEVEN A. GREENLAW, DAVID SHAPIRO, ERIC DODGE, CYNTHIA GAMEZ, ANDRES 
JAUREGUI, DIANE KEENAN, DAN MACDONALD, AMYAZ MOLEDINA, CRAIG RICHARDSON & RALPH 
SONENSHINE, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 276–80 (2d ed. 2017). 
2021] DATA BREACH SUPERFUND STATUTE 663 
initially seem as harmful to the public as polluting clean air or water, 
the social harms of data breaches can be just as serious. Preventing the 
misuse of data benefits society as whole, for example, by ensuring 
elections are fair and free from foreign interference and establishing 
protection for the most vulnerable from predatory criminals; without 
proper safeguards, the release of data diminishes these public goods. 
3. Assessing the Harm 
With the understanding that data breaches are public harms, a 
regulatory regime concerned mostly with individual privacy does not 
fully address the public harm associated with breaches. If a factory was 
to negligently dump waste on an individual’s property, that individual 
undoubtedly has suffered a personal harm. The government would 
likely respond by making such dumping a criminal offense and 
requiring companies to dispose of waste at designated sites. But what 
if the factory disposes of its waste properly at a dumpsite, and, over 
time, this waste seeps into a river, killing wildlife downstream? While 
government regulation successfully prevented personal harm to the 
individual, the public harm associated with the loss of wildlife remains.  
Similarly, a privacy-focused regulation addresses the personal 
harm to individuals affected by data breaches, but does not address the 
public harm incurred in situations where data are unidentifiable or 
individual privacy is not at stake. For example, Strava, a social media 
workout app, posted heat maps of users’ movements and locations 
around the world.116 Although the individuals were not named, experts 
were able to locate US military installations in the Middle East based 
on data revealed by service members using Strava.117 Even with a 
privacy regime in place, this direct harm to national security could still 
have occurred.  
B. FTC Limitations and Advantages 
1. The FTC’s Limited Ability to Enforce Preventative Measures 
The FTC plays a significant and effective role in promoting data 
security through its common law regulatory regime.118 Using the 
deceptive prong of Section 5 to enforce a firm’s own privacy policy 
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improves data collection practices in some ways.119 However, what 
happens when a firm’s data practices do not contradict its privacy policy 
but nonetheless remain inadequate?  
The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit faced this 
question in one of the few cases on Section 5, LABMD, Inc. v. FTC.120 
Rather than relying on the deceptive prong of Section 5, the FTC alleged 
the defendant’s data practices violated the unfairness prong of Section 
5.121 Specifically, the FTC argued that the defendant’s practices were 
unfair, meaning the practice was one that (1) causes substantial injury 
to consumers and (2) offends public policy well-grounded in statutes or 
the common law.122 With respect to the second element, the court failed 
to definitively hold whether the FTC’s unfairness claim could be 
grounded in a common law theory of negligence.123 Consequently, this 
negligence theory remains a potential source of litigation moving 
forward.124 Instead the court held the FTC’s order for the defendant to 
overhaul its cybersecurity and implement “reasonable standards” was 
unenforceable.125 This could significantly limit the FTC’s ability to 
address unfair or inadequate data security practices before a breach 
occurs.126 The FTC relies on the threat of enforcement to incentivize 
firms to comply with its data protection standards.127 If the FTC is 
limited to merely enforcing the terms of a firm’s privacy policy or the 
FTC’s unfairness claims must allege specific data failures and 
remedies, then it will mostly serve as a reactive regulator rather than 
a proactive one.128  
2. Limited Resources and Advantages 
Aside from the legal restraints on its Section 5 authority, the 
FTC is also an agency with limited resources when it comes to data 
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protection and privacy.129 As a result, the FTC must be particularly 
careful when considering enforcement actions, only pursuing those that 
offer the highest reward or the most effective form of deterrence.130 The 
FTC’s limited resources are especially evident when compared to 
privacy enforcers in other countries.131 Whereas most agencies in other 
countries focus entirely on privacy regulation, privacy is simply one 
part of the FTC’s complicated and expansive regulatory jurisdiction.132  
Despite these limitations, the FTC remains a data regulator 
with specific advantages that should not be overlooked. Several have to 
do with the agency’s structure. First, it is resistant to regulatory 
capture in ways other agencies are not because it does not regulate a 
single coherent industry.133 Second, because of its broad focus,  
it does not get bogged down in procedural practices for protecting 
information.134 Third, the FTC is an independent agency, which allows 
at least some bipartisan representation as well as staggered terms for 
commissioners;135 this arguably creates some political insulation.136 
However, the most important advantage the FTC has as a 
regulator is experience implementing a complex privacy regulatory 
regime.137 The FTC has emerged as the de facto privacy regulator 
governing vast segments of the private sector with little direction from 
Congress.138 It is tasked with overseeing privacy provisions in eight 
other federal statutes, including COPPA and the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (FRCA).139 Moreover, the FTC has the ability to react nimbly to 
changes in the market and changes in the technology.140 Given these 
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advantages, the FTC has significant value as a data regulator, despite 
its limited enforcement capabilities, that would not be easily replaced. 
C. Limitations of State Regulation 
By responding to a data breach or imposing tougher data 
protection measures, states can influence businesses’ behavior.141 Yet, 
their limited jurisdictional reach creates problems for consumers and 
firms.142 For example, most states have data breach notification 
requirements with strict penalties for companies that fail to comply.143 
In 2018, Uber paid a $148 million settlement for failing to notify 
consumers of a data breach.144 However, this state notification system 
has been described as a “fragmented, incoherent liability scheme.”145 
Each state has unique and sometimes inconsistent reporting 
requirements that impose significant compliance costs.146 Determining 
whether an individual is a resident of a particular state is also difficult 
and might even require a company to collect more data on an individual 
than it would otherwise.147 Notification laws are just one form of state 
regulation, but other forms of state regulation present similar 
problems.148  
D. National Legislation 
Given the issues with federal statutes and the costs of state 
regulation, a federal response to data breaches seems inevitable. 
Indeed, according to a 2019 Pew Research study, 75 percent of 
Americans believe there should be more regulation of private firms’ use 
of personal data. Moreover, only 8 percent of firms believe they should 
be regulated less.149  
One possible model for federal data breach legislation is the 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). GDPR 
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applies to any company that handles European data, so many 
multinational firms must already comply with its provisions.150 It 
regulates the “collection, use, storage, organization, disclosure or any 
other operation or set of operations performed on personal data” and 
defines personal data broadly.151 It is centered on a set of individual 
privacy and data control rights, much like the CCPA.152 However, 
unlike the CCPA, it also includes specific, risk-based security 
measures153 and a privacy-by-design approach in which firms only 
collect the data minimally necessary to complete a lawful purpose.154 In 
addition, GDPR contains breach notification requirements that require 
firms to notify designated government authorities and affected 
individuals within seventy-two hours of a breach.155 Individual member 
states enforce the provisions of GDPR and are permitted to issue 
significant fines for serious infractions.156 Individuals are also 
guaranteed judicial recourse in the event of a breach.157  
GDPR clearly addresses many of the issues associated with data 
breaches,158 but such prescriptive regulations have their costs. GDPR is 
an incredibly complex law and continues to add significant new 
obligations for firms handling data.159 The average cost of becoming 
GDPR compliant in 2018 was approximately $3 million per firm.160 
Notably, these heavy costs tend to strengthen the largest players with 
the resources and experts needed to comply with the law while pricing 
out smaller firms.161 Even US firms valued in the billions like Williams 
Sonoma and Valve have had to exit the European market because of the 
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costs of compliance associated with GDPR.162 Additionally, the 
implementation of GDPR was accompanied by a decline in European 
venture capital and start-up firms.163 While the importance of consumer 
data protection cannot be ignored,  at a certain point, heavy regulation 
may impose costs that hurt innovation and deter beneficial consumer 
products and services.164 
In light of these costs, the CCPA might serve as a better model 
for national legislation. The CCPA ultimately has fewer sweeping 
provisions than GDPR.165 Regarding data protection, the “reasonable 
security measures” requirement allows data holders, rather than 
regulators, to set data security practices.166 This is more consistent with 
the FTC’s approach to data security, which generates an ecosystem of 
mutual governance between firms and regulators.167 Compared to 
GDPR, the CCPA also implements far fewer stringent fines for 
violations. However, the cost of CCPA compliance is estimated to be 
quite similar to GDPR.168 This is likely because the costs of compliance 
are mostly attached to privacy requirements, like hiring privacy staff, 
rather than technical protections against data breaches.169 Indeed, 
more business executives seem to regard privacy governance as 
separate from the issue of data breaches altogether.170 Congress could 
take an approach similar to GDPR or the CCPA, but this type of 
regulation is expensive, and both are primarily centered on individual 
privacy. Both can and should serve as useful models for Congress, but 
an effective and comprehensive solution to the public harm associated 
with data breaches will require a different approach.  
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III. A DATA SUPERFUND STATUTE 
If the release of data is to be best understood as a public harm 
like pollution, then an effective regulatory approach should incorporate 
lessons from environmental law. That said, using environmental law as 
a model can be difficult as environmental regulation encompasses 
numerous modes of regulation.171 This is in part because the 
environment is a complex and highly interconnected system; as such, 
many of the root causes of pollution are also systematic.172 Indeed, the 
data environment is no different, and with this understanding, 
regulating data like regulating the environment will likely require a 
nuanced and multifaceted regulatory approach.173 Arguably, this is 
already occurring in an incremental fashion, as Congress and the states 
target specific industries and types of data pollution. While the United 
States may not be able to prevent all forms of data pollution, it could 
still implement a more comprehensive form of protection.  
A. CERCLA as a Comprehensive Solution 
1. Getting to CERCLA 
Similar to data regulation, environmental regulation has 
developed in a piecemeal fashion in response to growing public 
awareness and concern about pollution.174 The most significant 
environmental statutes were passed during the 1970s and 1980s.175 The 
first was the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which 
requires agencies to conduct an environmental impact statement before 
any major federal action.176 Congress also enacted two particularly 
sweeping and ambitious statutes targeted toward specific types of 
pollution: the Clean Water Act (CWA), regulating discharges into the 
water, and the Clean Air Act (CAA), regulating emissions into the air.177 
 
 171. See Neil Gunningham, Enforcing Environmental Regulation, 23 J. ENV’T L. 169,  
172–74 (2011).  
 172. See generally Clean Air Act Overview, Air Pollution: Current and Future Challenges, 
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/air-pollution-current-and-fu-
ture-challenges [https://perma.cc/A8L4-YSRZ] (last visited Feb. 3, 2021). 
 173. See Gunningham, supra note 171. 
 174. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United 
States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in the United 
States, 20 VA. ENV’T L.J. 75 (2001) (discussing the creation and evolution of environmental law in 
the United States and the gradual means by which that occurred).  
 175. See generally id. (outlining the most relevant environmental statutes in the United 
States, revealing that the majority of them were passed in the 1970s and 1980s). 
 176. Id. at 77. 
 177. Id. at 78–79. 
670 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.  [Vol. 23:3:649 
Even in the face of an energy crisis and industry resistance, these laws 
survived with only minor modifications.178 Indeed, Congress went on to 
pass several more environmental laws targeted towards toxic and 
hazardous substances.179  
This period of environmental legislative action culminated with 
the passage of the last major environmental legislation to date, the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA), also known as the Superfund.180 CERCLA was passed 
in response to alarming hazardous waste practices and management in 
the 1970s.181 It was arguably the most far-reaching of all environmental 
statutes.182 Its basic design is relatively simple. CERCLA imposes strict 
liability for the release or threatened release of any “hazardous 
substances,” which encompasses just about any toxic substance as well 
as any substance the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) deems 
“an imminent and substantial danger” to public health or safety.183 
Additionally, CERCLA liability is broad; it is the first environmental 
statute that subjects every major Fortune 500 company, many small 
businesses, and nonprofit institutions to environmental liability.184   
Since its passage, CERCLA has been subject to criticism, and 
scholars continue to debate its effectiveness.185 The original statute was 
rushed through Congress, which left courts to grapple with a number of 
ambiguities.186 While there are many problems with CERCLA as a 
statute, a full analysis of its provisions is beyond this Note. However, 
the basic design of this statute still offers a particularly compelling 
regulatory model for data breaches.   
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2. Filling Regulatory Gaps 
One advantage of CERCLA is that it serves as a backdrop to 
other environmental statutes without supplanting other forms of 
regulation.187 Indeed, the statute was partially designed to “fill the 
gaps” left by other federal environmental statutes.188 For example, 
while the types of hazardous waste covered by the statute are broad, it 
specifically exempts substances regulated by other federal statutes.189  
Such an accommodating design would be desirable in the context 
of data protection. The issue with current federal data breach statutes 
is not that they fail to accomplish their statutory objectives; rather, it 
is that, together, they fail to comprehensively protect data.190 Arguably, 
statutes like HIPAA, which regulates data pollution from health care 
providers, and COPPA, which regulates data pollution from minors, 
play a similar role as the CWA or CAA. Public concern over data 
collection varies among specific purposes and industries.191 Protecting 
certain types of data, like data relating to children, may demand stricter 
regulations while other types may not be as critical to protect.  
At the same time, CERCLA’s liability regime holds nearly all 
environmental polluters accountable, which prevents businesses from 
escaping liability. CERCLA liability extends not only to parties that 
actually dispose of hazardous waste but also to the parties that generate 
and transport the waste.192 Over time, courts have interpreted this 
liability to be “strict, joint and several, and retroactive.”193 Considering 
the data collection and resale practices of data brokers, such liability in 
the context of data breaches could play a critical role in holding 
businesses accountable. Under current law, as long as a business 
permits data sharing in its privacy policy, it can sell data to 
irresponsible third parties without any consequences.  
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3. Incentives 
CERCLA’s liability regime also serves as a powerful incentive 
for businesses to prevent environmental pollution from occurring in the 
first place. Under a strict liability regime, parties are held accountable 
for any harm that results from certain activities, often characterized  
as ultrahazardous activities, regardless of the level of care they 
exercised.194  
Strict liability has been discussed as an effective tool to 
encourage data security and prevent data breaches.195 Generally 
speaking, the certainty of liability in the event a breach occurs and the 
financial penalties that come along with it would force firms that collect 
and hold data to internalize the full costs of their activities.196 Ideally, 
this would prevent the firms that are operating with suboptimal levels 
of data protection from entering the market in the first place.197  
4. Administration 
Furthermore, CERCLA, unlike other environmental statutes, 
not only serves to prevent environmental pollution from occurring but 
it also enables regulators to take direct action in response to the release 
of pollutants.198 Although liability is at the heart of CERCLA, the 
statute complements this liability with specific response and 
remediation provisions.199  
Despite many similarities, data has certain unique qualities 
that make this part of the CERCLA model difficult to replicate.200 
Prominent examples include the cleanup requirements, which direct 
the EPA to establish standards and actually clean up polluted sites.201 
Unlike the cleanup of localized hazardous waste, data cannot be 
scrubbed, and it may very well be impossible to retrieve once it has been 
released.202  
Nevertheless, there are still two critical, ex-post provisions of 
CERCLA that would serve to improve federal responses to data 
breaches. One such provision is the notification requirements under 
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Section 103(a).203 This Section requires a party who is responsible for a 
release of a hazardous substance exceeding the regulatory limit to 
immediately notify a National Response Center.204 Similar notification 
requirements could apply to companies that release a certain amount 
of personal data as a result of a data breach. Another part of CERCLA 
that would be particularly useful for data breaches is the superfund 
provision, which provides the EPA with independent financing to 
respond to and clean up releases.205 This provision is quite similar to 
the Consumer Privacy Fund provisions in the CCPA.206 Although data 
cannot be cleaned, there are still mitigation techniques that can be 
employed to shift and spread the costs of a breach.207 A data regulator 
with independent funding would not have to wait for lengthy judicial 
proceedings to take action when a breach occurs.  
B. Implementing a Data Superfund Statute 
1. Statutory Objectives  
When it comes to implementing a data superfund statute, 
inevitably, the CERCLA model would need to be adjusted, but as a 
whole it offers numerous advantages compared to other models of data 
regulation. Importantly, a data superfund statute modeled after 
CERCLA would remain primarily focused on protecting data without 
sacrificing some privacy objectives. Privacy is no doubt important in 
some contexts, but prescriptive privacy regimes like GDPR and the 
CCPA are expensive.208 Privacy costs may be justifiable for health care 
data or children’s data, but they would likely lead to unacceptable 
inefficiencies if applied to the economy as a whole.209 A data protection 
statute modeled after CERCLA would allow for a more flexible 
approach to privacy. Moreover, strict liability and joint liability, even in 
a regime focused on public harms, would allow the data superfund 
statute to indirectly improve consumer privacy. For instance, the risk 
of future liability may encourage behavior that is otherwise required by 
the GDPR privacy-by-design provision.210 Instead of requiring a lawful 
purpose to collect minimally necessary data, firms with suboptimal 
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levels of data protection would face powerful incentives to not collect 
more data than necessary for their business purpose.211  
2. Allocating Responsibility 
Implementing strict and joint liability under a data superfund 
statute would also serve to allocate responsibility for preventing 
breaches in a more effective way.212 Since this type of liability 
essentially rises proportionately to the potential harm of a breach, firms 
could weigh the costs and risks of a breach on their own terms.213 
Although this could also lead to overcompliance, there are fewer 
opportunity costs and efficiency losses resulting from the government 
incorrectly weighing the risks of data collection practices.214 
Furthermore, without as many prescriptive requirements, companies 
may be spared the heaviest GDPR expenses that result from mandatory 
compliance personnel.215   
Holding firms jointly liable would also make sense in the context 
of data because firms are usually in a better position than consumers to 
assess the quality of a business’s data protection measures.216 This is 
particularly salient considering consumers’ behavior towards privacy 
policies and the privacy paradox more generally.217 While consumers 
will continue to provide information to firms with suboptimal data 
practices, a firm is unlikely to ignore the risk of liability.218 In 
particular, even if firms were to transfer data to third parties or protect 
themselves with a contract, they would still ultimately be responsible 
to the public.219  
Nevertheless, there are downsides to this approach. A single 
business with adequate security standards could be left footing the bill 
because another business was irresponsible. CERCLA allows parties to 
seek out contribution from other liable parties, but this can be difficult 
in practice.220 However, many of these concerns were created by court 
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interpretations of a hastily written statute.221 A data superfund statute 
could avoid these mistakes, for example, by making joint liability 
explicit in the statute.   
3. Utilizing Existing Structures  
Another advantage to the CERCLA model is that Congress could 
use existing state and federal regulatory structures to implement a data 
protection equivalent. The FTC could serve the same role for the data 
superfund statute as the EPA does for CERCLA.222 As discussed in 
Section II.B.2, the FTC already has significant expertise and experience 
enforcing privacy regulation in the United States.223 The FTC 
Commissioner has a narrower set of responsibilities than an attorney 
general but retains the advantage of having a broader interest than 
European data regulators.224 Moreover, companies seeking to avoid 
liability under the data superfund statute could largely follow FTC 
guidance. Since the Act would center around liability rather than 
specific terms, the FTC and courts could continue to build off the 
Section 5 common law of privacy.225 This would provide more 
flexibility—similar to the reasonable security duty in the CCPA—with 
less uncertainty.226  
Furthermore, the FTC would administer the data trust fund and 
initiate data cleanups. To mitigate private costs, the FTC could ensure 
that consumers immediately receive identity theft protection. This is 
already something the FTC incorporates into settlements after a data 
breach, except with a trust fund it could be done without lengthy 
judicial proceedings.227 For more public costs, the FTC could provide 
Congress, other government agencies, and state governments the 
information they need to implement new policies to respond to a  
breach. It could also coordinate an industry response among major 
stakeholders, such as data insurers, cybersecurity firms, and banks.  
As part of enforcement, CERCLA also enables a private cause of 
action; thus, private individuals bear the burden of enforcement along 
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with government regulators.228 This is present in both GDPR and the 
CCPA but absent from many federal data protection requirements.229 
However, unlike the CCPA, a data superfund statute would contain no 
qualifying language or “reasonable security” safe harbor to prevent 
lawsuits.230 This feature has the potential to relieve regulatory burdens 
that would be more prominent for an agency like the FTC, which 
already faces limited resources.231 
A data superfund statute could work in tandem with state  
law when it comes to notification requirements. A national data  
breach response center would provide a uniform reporting system for 
businesses while utilizing state frameworks to carry out the response. 
This would allow federal regulators to build off the experiences of state 
regulators enforcing state notification laws while addressing the 
problems associated with the current patchwork of state and federal 
statutes.232 Much like GDPR, it could coordinate responses and require 
notification in the event of a breach. Although regulators cannot 
necessarily retrieve data, a national response system could still improve 
accountability and give victims and policy makers more of an 
opportunity to mitigate damages.233 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The current regulatory approach and public concerns associated 
with data breaches are overwhelmingly focused on protecting 
individual privacy. While consumer privacy is important, this 
framework only addresses one aspect of the data problem. The harms 
associated with data breaches go beyond identity theft or personal 
exposure. As personal data are collected on an increasingly massive 
scale, the predictive capacity of this data will correspondingly expand. 
With this will come insight into human behavior that could provide 
substantial benefits to society, but it could also serve as a potent 
weapon to exploit the public. Data breaches are fundamentally social 
problems, and the federal government must do more to prevent these 
social harms.   
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GDPR and the CCPA exhibit a primarily privacy-based 
approach to data breaches. Although they are comprehensive, these 
statutes present significant costs to businesses and regulators alike.  
A data superfund statute, by contrast, would incorporate some  
data protection models from both laws without the significant 
compliance costs. Perhaps with advances in technology, expansive 
measures ensuring consumer control over personal data might be 
justified. Yet, for now, individual privacy would be better served by  
a sector-specific approach. A liability-focused regime with limited 
prescriptive requirements would provide a flexible but effective 
regulatory regime as society defines the contours of privacy rights in 
the modern world.  
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